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TENANT, LODGER, AND GUEST: QUESTIONABLE
CATEGORIES FOR MODERN RENTAL OCCUPANTS
POPULATION expansion and improved construction methods have vastly
changed the character and increased the importance of rental housing.' Hun-
dreds of thousands of families presently occupy multi-unit rental structures
of widely varying types. A large number occupy dwelling units in buildings
expressly designed for long-term rental, such as garden apartments and resi-
dence or apartment hotels, some of which accommodate hundreds of families.-
Others live in large homes which have been converted into residences for twvo
or more families. Still others reside either temporarily or indefinitely in build-
ings constructed primarily for short-term occupancy, such as inns, hotels,
motels, and tourist homes.
Modem rental occupants differ greatly with respect to the length of time
they remain on the premises: some reside there permanently; some remain for
extended periods while retaining permanent homes elsewhere; some stay only
briefly while traveling. Occupants also differ in regard to the nature and num-
ber of the services they receive from the owner of the property. Some receive
all conveniences ordinarily provided in hotels, such as maid and janitorial ser-
vice, and assume no obligations as to the repair of their dwelling units. Others
occupy their units completely independently of the owner, assume full re-
sponsibility for the care of the premises and their belongings contained therein,
and provide for all necessary services themselves.
Courts have categorized rental occupants as tenants, lodgers, and guests.3
1. See N.Y. Mus.TIPLE DWETLLING LAW ix-xxi. See also Madfes V. Beverly Devel p-
ment Corporation, 251 N.Y. 12, 166 N.E. 787 (1929) (dissenting opinion).
For purposes of this discussion the word "rent" will be used to encompass any money
paid by an occupant to an owner for the use of the premises.
2. For example, a large development in New York City was designed to consist of five
14-story buildings containing, in the aggregate, 2,095 apartments. N.Y. Times, May 27,
1951, § 8, p. 6, col. 4. One apartment project in New York City covered 192 acres and
accommodated 12,200 families. N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELLixG LAW ix.
These structures contain innumerable varieties of units. One apartment building,
erected in New York City in 1951, contained units ranging from one and one-half to
eight and one-half rooms. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1951, § 8, p. 6, col. 4.
3. See Roberts v. Casey, 36 Cal. App. 2d 767, 93 P.2d 654 (Super. Ct. 1939) ; Cedar
Rapids Inv. Co. v. Commodore Hotel Co., 205 Iowa 736, 218 N.W. 510 (1928) ; 2 "M:N.
L. REv. 1055 (1938). For further discussion of these relationships, see 1 AMERICA:. LAw
OF PRoPFRTY § 3.7 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 34 (1912);
BEALE, INNxEEPERS §§ 138, 139, 140, 291 (1906); 17 TFsx. L REv. 3s0 (1939).
Occupants may receive more specialized classification as "employees" or "servants!"
However, these designations are beyond the purview of this analysis. For discussion of
the employee-tenant distinction, see 20 WAsH. L REv. 169 (1945); 1 Aumuma LAw oy
PROPERTY § 3.8 (Casner ed. 1952).
Some courts have used "boarder" and "roomer" as a synonym for "lodger." See, e.g.,
City of Independence v. Richardson, 117 Kan. 656, 232 Pac. 1044 (1925) ; Pullman Palace
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Conversely, they have designated the owners or managers of rented property
as landlords, lodginghouse keepers, and innkeepers. 4 Since owners may have
differing relationships with their various occupants,5 courts have focused
primarily on the living donditions of the occupant of the rented premises in
arriving at their categorizations.
The "Exclusiveness" and "Transiency" Tests
In determining the status of an occupant as either tenant or lodger, courts
have formulated the test of "exclusiveness" :o the tenant is said to have ex-
clusive possession of his quarters, 7 while the lodger has merely a right to the
use of the premises, the owner retaining control of and access to them.8 This
test springs from the conceptual distinctions employed since the beginning of
property law. For the relation of landlord and tenant to exist, there must be a
grant of the exclusive possession of property for a specified term.9 Such a
Car Co. v. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239, 247, 44 N.W. 226, 228 (1899) ; Beall v. Everson, 34 A.2d 41
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1943). In this Comment the term "lodger" will include both "board-
ers" and "roomers."
Parties may contract as to their status, and courts will enforce this instead of the
relationship dictated by the factual pattern of occupancy. See Baldwin Piano Co. v.
Congress Hotel Co., 243 Ill. App. 118 (1926).
4. See Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 184 Va. 943, 36 S.E.2d 906 (1946) ; 22 MINN. L. Rr.v.
1055 (1938).
"Lodginghouse keeper" will herein encompass "boardinghouse keeper." Further, while
some of the cases use "landlord" to mean anyone owning or operating rented premises, land-
lord will here indicate the owner or manager of premises occupied by tenants. And an "inn-
keeper" includes hotel owners. Dixon v. Robbins, 246 N.Y. 169, 172, 158 N.E. 63 (1927)
(dictum); Appeal of Wellsboro Hotel Co., 336 Pa. 171, 174, 7 A.2d 334, 335 (1939)
(same).
5. An owner may be simultaneously an innkeeper, lodginghouse keeper, and landlord
as to his various occupants. Erwin v. City of San Diego, 112 Cal. App. 2d 213, 217, 246
P.2d 105, 108 (4th Dist. 1952) (dictum) ; Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 184 Va. 943, 948, 36
S.E.2d 906, 908 (1946) (same).
Some courts have held that the nature of the premises raises a rebuttable presumption
as to the occupant's status. See, e.g., Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac.
1099 (1892) (occupant presumed to have gone to "hotel" as a guest).
Even as to the same occupant, an owner may occupy one relationship for one purpose, as
for statutory classification, and another with respect to a question such as tort liability.
See, e.g., McClaugherty v. Cline, 128 Tenn. 605, 163 S.W. 801 (1913).
6. Taylor v. Dean, 78 A.2d 382 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951); Byrd v. Feilding, 238
S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); 1 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.7 (Casner ed.
1952) ; 17 TEx. L. REv. 380 (1939) and cases there cited; 22 MIxN. L. REV. 1055 (1938)
and cases there cited.
7. Coggins v. Gregorio, 97 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1938); Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo.
App. 789, 84 S.W.2.d 947 (1935); Linwood Park Co. v. Van Dusen, 63 Ohio St. 183, 58
N.E. 576 (1900).
8. Beall v. Everson, 34 A.2d 41 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1943); Carroll v. Cooney, 116
Conn. 112, 163 Atl. 599 (1933) ; White v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250, 15 Am. Rep. 28 (1872).
9. WOODFALL, LANDLORD AND TENANT 2 (24th ed., Blundell, 1939) ; FOA, OUTLINE
OF THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 17 (1928); GEAR, A TEATrsa OF ThE LAW oF
LANDLORD AND TENANT 136 (1888).
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grant is considered a lease 1o and gives the tenant an "interest in land."" If
the owner does not transfer exclusive possession to the occupant, the occupant
is termed a lodger and holds property only under a license.'-
The occupant has exclusive possession only if the owner has not retained
a right to enter the premises during occupancy.' 3 Courts have considered a
variety of factors as indicating that the occupant was not entitled to exclusive
possession or that the owner intruded upon it: the owner lived in the same
building as the occupant ;14 the owner retained a key to the occupant's rooms ;15
the owner was charged with cleaning hallways and windows ;1o the owmer had
the right to enter the premises to make repairs ;17 the occupant shared a bath
The exclusiveness test achieved its modem form from the construction of certain nine-
teenth century English statutes. Each of these statutes required the courts to distinguish
between various types of occupants. See Ancketill v. Baylis, 10 Q.B.D. 577 (182) (lodger
and tenant had different voting rights under a voting statute) ; Kent v. Fittall, [19051 1 K.B.
60 (same) ; Ness v. Stephenson, 9 Q.B.D. 245 (1882) (statute exempting "lodgers" from
distraint for rent); Reg. v. Assessment Committee of St. George's Union, L.R. 7 Q.B. 90
(1871) (taxing statute).
10. In re Owl Drug Co., 12 F. Supp. 439 (D. Nev. 1935) ; Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal.
2d 610, 184 P.2d 879 (1947) ; Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co., 187 Mass. 402, 73 N.E. 523 (1905).
11. McDowell v. Hyman, 117 Cal. 67, 48 Pac. 984 (1897) ; Beck v. Bechtel Hotels,
Inc-, 72 A.2d 36 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950) ; Mallam v. Trans-Texas Airways, 227 S.W2d
344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
12. Tips v. United States, 70 F2d 525 (5th Cir. 1934) ; People v. Vaughan, 65 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 844, 150 P2d 964 (1944); Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co., 187 Mass. 402, 73
N.E. 523 (1905) ; 1 McADam, LANDLORD AND TEmAhT 239 (5th ea 1934) ; III KmEr's
Com FxmaiEs 452 ni.1 (b) (14th ed. 1896).
13. It is unclear whether an unexercised right of entry is enough to breach exclusive
possession or whether actual entry is necessary, since most cases involve an actual entry
by the owner, making the occupant a lodger under either standard. See, e.g., Fox v.
Windemere Hotel Apartment Co., 30 Cal. App. 162, 157 Pac. 820 (1st Dist. 1916) ; Carroll
v. Cooney, 116 Conn. 112, 163 Atl. 599 (1933) ; Peaks Y. Cobb, 197 Mass. 554, 83 N.E.
1106 (1908). One case, however, specifically states that right of entry alone is sufficient.
See Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789, 84 S.WV2d 947 (1935). See also Dewar v.
MAinneapolis Lodge No. 44, B. & P.O.E., 155 Minn. 98, 192 N.W. 358 (1923) (occupant
held lodger because owner exercised "general control and supervision" of the premises).
A few courts have held that even though there has been an actual entry, the occupant
may still be a tenant. See Martin v. Shryock Realty Co., 236 Mo. App. 1265, 163 S.\V2d
804 (1942) (occupant held tenant since services provided by owner could be waived; thus
no one had right to enter apartment without consent of occupants); Shearman v. Iriquois
Hotel and Apartment Co., 42 Misc. 217, 85 N.Y. Supp. 365 (Sup. Ct. 1903) (occupant held
tenant since services provided by owner did not interfere with or limit tenant's right of use
and occupation).
14. Carroll v. Cooney, 116 Conn. 112, 115, 163 Atl. 599, 600 (1933) ; Byrd v. Feilding,
238 S.W2d 614, 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
15. Erwin v. City of San Diego, 112 Cal. App. 2d 213, 246 P.2d 105 (4th Dist. 1952);
Lambert v. Sine, 256 P2d 241 (Utah 1953).
16. Roberts v. Casey, 36 Cal. App. 2d 767, 93 P2d 654 (Super. Ct. 1939) ; Marden v.
Radford, 229 Mlo. App. 789, 84 S.W.2d 947 (1935).
17. Fox v. Windemere Hotel Apartment Co., 30 Cal. App. 162, 157 Pac. 820 (1st
Dist. 1916); Simmons v. Weinsoff, 58 A.2d 497 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948); Byrd v.
Feilding, 238 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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or kitchen with the owner ;18 the premises were furnished ;19 maid service was
provided ;20 towels and linens were supplied ;21 light, heat, and water were
provided. 22 In cases establishing some or all of the above factors, the occupant
has normally been held to be a lodger.
23
Courts have devised the test of "transiency" to distinguish between the lod-
ger and the guest.2 4 The guest is one who stays at a place for an uncertain but
temporary period while traveling ;25 a lodger stays for a longer and more
definite period 26 and makes the premises his present home.27 The transiency
test evolved from conditions existing in early England. Since traveling was
18. Roberts v. Casey, 36 Cal. App. 2d 767, 93 P.2d 654 (Super. Ct. 1939) ; Taylor v.
Dean, 78 A.2d 382 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951).
19. Carroll v. Cooney, 116 Conn. 112, 163 Atl. 599 (1933) ; Mathews v. Livingston, 86
Conn. 263, 85 AtI. 529 (1912).
20. Tamamian v. Gabbard, 55 A.2d 513 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947); Martin v.
Shryock Realty Co., 236 Mo. App. 1265, 163 S.W.2d 804 (1942).
21. Lindsey v. Watson, 83 A.2d 226 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951); Messerly v. Mercer,
45 Mo. App. 327 (1891); Lambert v. Sine, 256 P.2d 241 (Utah 1953).
22. Lambert v. Sine, 256 P.2d 241 (Utah 1953); Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App.
789, 84 S.W.2d 947 (1935).
23. See, e.g., Roberts v. Casey, 36 Cal. App. 2d 767, 93 P.2d 654 (Super. Ct. 1939);
Taylor v. Dean, 78 A.2d 382 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951); Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo.
App. 789, 84 S.W.2d 947 (1935) ; Mallam v. Trans-Texas Airways, 227 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949). Conversely, when these facts are not established, the courts are likely
to find a landlord-tenant relationship. See, e.g., Coggins v. Gregorio, 97 F.2d 948 (10th
Cir. 1938); Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 85 Atl. 529 (1912); Green v. Shoe-
maker, 111 Md. 69, 73 At. 688 (1909).
24. Burdock v. Chicago Hotel Co., 172 Ill. App. 185 (1912); Hart v. Mills Hotel
Trust, 144 Misc. 121, 258 N.Y. Supp. 417 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1932); Meacham v. Galloway,
102 Tenn. 415, 52 S.W. 859 (1899) ; 14 R.C.L. 496 (1916) and cases there collected; 22
MINN. L. RFv. 1055 (1938).
25. Petit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 S.W. 501 (1912); Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25
Iowa 553 (1868) ; Holstein v. Phillips & Sims, 146 N.C. 366, 59 S.E. 1037 (1907); 22
MiNN. L. REv. 1055 (1938).
26. In most cases where the occupant is held to be a lodger, there is some sort of
contractual agreement between the owner and the occupant either as to rate or length
of stay. See, e.g., Clifford v. Stafford, 145 Ill. App. 247 (1908) ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Altamont Springs Hotel Co., 206 Ky. 494, 267 S.W. 555 (1925) ; Asseltyne v. Fay
Hotel, 222 Minn. 91, 23 N.W.2d 357 (1946); Smith v. Dorchester Hotel Co., 145 Wash.
344, 259 Pac. 1085 (1927).
Normally, mere length of stay does not convert a guest into a lodger. Moon v. Yarian,
147 Ill. App. 383 (1909); Ross v. Mellin, 36 Minn. 421, 32 N.W. 172 (1887); Leon v.
Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 134 Neb. 137, 277 N.W. 823 (1938). But cf. Crapo v. Rockwell,
48 Misc. 1, 94 N.Y. Supp. 1122 (Sup. Ct. 1905). However, some occupants have been
held lodgers without a special agreement as to length of stay when they have remained
on the premises for extended periods of time paying a weekly or monthly rate. See, e.g.,
Gray v. Drexel Arms Hotel, 146 Ill. App. 604 (1909) ; McIntosh v. Schops, 92 Ore. 307,
180 Pac. 593 (1919).
27. Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789, 799, 84 S.W.2d 947, 954 (1935) (dictum);
McIntosh v. Schops, 92 Ore. 307, 309, 180 Pac. 593 (1919) (same).
The origin of the distinction between the lodger and the guest is Calye's case, [1584]
8 Co. Rep. 32a, 77 Eng. Rep. 520 (a "neighbor ... is no traveller"), and an accompanying
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slow and hazardous, 28 travelers were limited in their choice of accommoda-
tions.2 9 Innkeepers with available rooms were therefore placed under the duty
of accepting any person requesting accommodations,"0 and strict safeguards
were provided for the protection of both parties3 1 In contrast, lodgers were
persons who usually lived for longer periods of time in private homes in close
association with the owners.32 For this reason they had both the aim and the
opportunity of selecting suitable quarters. Lodginghouse keepers were given
a corresponding right to select those whom they desired to occupy their
premises.3 3 Since each party had the chance to assess the character of the
other, fewer mutual protections were given them by the courts. 34
Although the transiency test is widely applied,35 confusion has developed
concerning the factors distinguishing the transient from the non-transient One
note, ibid. ("If a man hires a chamber for a term ... the innkeeper is not chargeable")
(emphasis added). However, the distinction did not become well recognized until the 17th
century. See Daniel v. Hotel Pacific Pty., Ltd., [1953] Argus Law Rep. 1043.
28. Transients during these times were, of course, subject to many dangers, not the
least of which wvas the threat of robbery by highwaymen or bandits. SLe Crapo v. Rock-
well, 48 Misc. 1, 94 N.Y. Supp. 1122 (Sup. Ct. 1905) ; BEA.E, INNmEP~rs §§ 1-6 (1905).
29. Inns developed for the entertainment of travelers while on their journeys. See
Odom v. East Avenue Corp., 178 Misc. 363, 34 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Sawdey
Liquor License Case, 369 Pa. 19, 85 A.2d 28 (1951) ; II Kmxfs Co ETzrAmEs 596 (14th
ed. 1896). However, the traveler could never be sure of the character of the innkeeper
or his servants, and frequently inns wcre very unsafe. See Crapo v. Rockwell, 43 Misc. 1,
94 N.Y. Supp. 1122 (Sup. Ct. 1905); Hulett v. Swift, 33 N.Y. 571 (1865) ; McIntosh v.
Schopps, 92 Ore. 307, 180 Pac. 593 (1919) ; Bz.,, INNKEEPERS § 331 (1906).
30. Petit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 SAV. 501 (1912); Nelson v. Johnson, 104
Minn. 440, 116 N.W. 828 (1908) ; Roberts v. Case Hotel Co., 106 Misc. 481, 175 N.Y. Supp.
123 (Sup. Ct 1919). The only limitations on this rule were that the applicant present
himself in a receivable condition and pay the going rate. Thompson v. Lacy, (182-0]
3 B. & Aid. 283, 287, 106 Eng. Rep. 667, 668 (dictum). See also Petit v. Thomas, 103 Ark.
593, 598, 148 S.V. 501, 503 (1912) (same) ; 23 TExAs L. Rzv. 2-89 (1945).
31. Since the transient was compelled to place implicit trust in the imkeepers and
his employees, strict duties were imposed on the innkeeper, such as his absolute duty to
protect the goods of his guests. See II K~r~'s ComENTr.uuEs 594 (14th ed. 1896);
Beale v. Posey, 72 Ala. 323 (1882) ; Hulett v. Sxift, 33 N.Y. 571 (1865). Since the inn-
keeper likewise had no opportunity to assess the character of his guests, he %%as given a
countervailing protection against overdue rents in the innkeeper's lien. See Roberts v. Case
Hotel Co., 106 Misc. 481, 175 N.Y. Supp. 123 (Sup. Ct 1919).
32. The early English cases defining a lodger clearly contemplated a close personal
relationship between occupant and owner. See, e.g., Ness v. Stephenson, 9 Q.B.D. 245, 252
(1882) (quoting Lindley, L.J.: "A lodger denotes a personal relation of some one lodging
somewhere with somebody.") ; Monks v. Dykes, [1839] 4 U. & NV. 567, 569, 150 Eng. Rep.
1546, 1547; WOODFALL, LAxDLoRD AIm TENANT 10 (24th ed., Blundell, 1939). See also
1 AiEmcAN LAW or PaoPEn Y § 3.7 (Casner ed. 1952).
33. For modern recognition of this right, see Birmingham Railway, Light & Power
Co. v. Drennen, 175 Ala. 338, 355, 57 So. 876, 882 (1911) (dictum); Huntley v. Stanch-
field, 168 Wis. 119, 123, 169 N.V. 276, 277 (1918) (same).
34. For example, a lodginghouse keeper is not an insurer of the goods of a ludger,
but is liable only upon a showing of negligence. See note 49 infra. Conversely, the lodging-
house keeper had no common law lien for unpaid rent. See note 65 infra.
35. See, e.g., Cottmire v. 181 East Lake Shore Drive Hotel Corp., 330 Ill. App. 549,
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line of decisions has held that where a contract exists between owner and
occupant regarding price and/or length of stay, it constitutes conclusive proof
that the occupant is not a transient and therefore is not a guest.01 Another
group of cases has regarded this "special contract" merely as evidence of lod-
ger status.37 These courts have emphasized a variety of additional facts in dis-
tinguishing the guest from the lodger: whether the dwelling unit was in a hotel
rather than a private home ;38 whether the occupant had another home :
whether the occupant received the same treatment as short-term guests.40 De-




A court's classification of a particular occupant as tenant, lodger, or guest
is almost always determinative of the legal rights and duties of both the
occupant and the owner. The consequences resulting from classification may
conveniently be summarized in connection with three general types of actions
ihvolving owners and occupants of rented premises.
The tenant is accorded different treatment from the lodger and guest in cases
involving the use and enjoyment of rented premises, because only the tenant
has an interest in land.4 2  Thus only a tenant may maintain possessory
actions, such as actions for ejectment, trespass, or nuisance.48 Notice to quit is
required to terminate the possession of a tenant, but not the possession of a
71 N.E.2d 823 (1947); Layton v. Seward Corp., 320 Mich. 418, 31 N.W.2d 678 (1948);
Asseltyne v. Fay Hotel, 222 Minn. 91, 23 N.W.2d 357 (1946).
36. See, e.g., Clifford v. Stafford, 145 Ill. App. 247 (1908); Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. v. Altamont Springs Hotel Co., 206 Ky. 494, 267 S.W. 555 (1924); Neal v.
Wilcox, 49 N.C. 146, 67 Am. Dec. 266 (1856). See also Daniel v. Hotel Pacific Pty., Ltd.,
[1953] Argus L. Rep. 1043.
In the absence of a special contract, courts have examined other factors to determine
whether the occupant was a lodger or guest. See cases cited note 26 supra.
37. See, e.g., Cottmire v. 181 East Lake Shore Drive Hotel Corp., 330 Ill. App. 549,
71 N.E.2d 823 (1947); Ross v. Mellin, 36 Minn. 421, 32 N.W. 172 (1887); Leon v.
Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 134 Neb. 137, 277 N.W. 823 (1938); Hancock v. Rand, 94
N.Y. 1, 46 Am. Rep. 112 (1883) ; Smith v. Dorchester Hotel Co., 145 Wash. 344, 259 Pac.
1085 (1927).
38. See Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099 (1891) ; Layton v.
Seward Corp., 320 Mich. 418, 31 N.W.2d 678 (1948).
39. Ross v. Mellin, 36 Minn. 421, 32 N.W. 172 (1887) ; Smith v. Dorchester Hotel Co.,
145 Wash. 344, 259 Pac. 1085 (1927) ; Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 (1874). See also
Lusk v. Belote, 22 Minn. 468 (1876) (occupants held lodgers because they were residents
of the city in which the hotel was located).
40. Cottmire v. 181 East Lake Shore Drive Hotel Corp., 330 Ill. App. 549, 71 N.E.2d
823 (1947) ; Leon v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 134 Neb. 137, 277 N.W. 823 (1938).
41. See, e.g., Gray v. Drexel Arms Hotel, 146 Ill. App. 604 (1909) (occupant had no
other abode); Leon v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 134 Neb. 137, 277 N.W. 823 (1938)
(occupant received same treatment as other transients).
42. See note 11 supra.
43. See Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 267, 85 Atl. 529, 531 (1912) (dictum)
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lodger or guest." If a tenant leaves the premises in violation of an agreement,
the landlord may bring an action for rent;45 if a lodger or guest leaves, the
owner is confined to a suit for breach of contract, with the resulting duty to
mitigate damages.46 A lease is within the Statute of Frauds, in contrast to an
agreement for lodgings.47 And a covenant in a lease prohibiting subletting is
not violated if the tenant turns the premises over to a lodger.s
The category of the occupant also determines who bears the responsibility
for protecting the occupant's property. Lodgers and tenants have the duty to
(ejectment and trespass) ; Roberts v. Casey, 36 Cal. App. 2d 767, 771, 93 P2d 654, 657
(Super. Ct 1939) (same); 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TEA ,r 34 (1912).
It has long been the rule that only one who has an "interest in land" may bring a suit
for damage to that land caused by a nuisance. See generally, Hosmer v. Republic Steel
& Iron Co., 179 Ala. 415, 60 So. 801 (1913); Klassen v. Central Kansas Cooperative
Creamery Ass'n, 160 Kan. 697, 165 P.2d 601 (1946). Thus some courts felt that even in
suits for personal injuries due to nuisance an interest in land had to be shovn. See Brode-
rick v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 601, 36 A.2d 585 (1944) ; Kavanagh v. Barber, 131
N.Y. 211, 30 N.E. 235 (1892). However, most courts in personal injury actions have
allowed anyone lawfully occupying the premises to recover. See Klassen v. Centeral Kansas
Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, 160 Kan. 697, 165 P.2d 601 (1946) ; United Electric Light
Co. v. The Deliso Construction Co., 315 Mass. 313, 52 N.E.2d 553 (1943) ; Hodges v. Town
of Drew, 172 Miss. 668, 159 So. 298 (1935).
44. Hundley v. Milner Hotel Management Co., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 206 (W.D. Ky.
1953) (occupant held tenant-notice necessary); Dewar Y. Minneapolis Lodge, No. 44,
B. & P.O.E., 155 Minn. 98, 192 NAV. 358 (1923) (occupant held lodger-notice unneces-
sary); Tamamian v. Gabbard, 55 A2d 513 (D.C. Mun. Ct App. 1947) (occupant held
lodger-notice unnecessary); 1 AmzalCAN LAw OF PRoPERTY § 3.7 (Casner ed. 1952).
At common law, the length of the rental period usually determined the amount of
notice required. See id. at § 3.90. Amount of notice is now generally covercd by statute,
and in many instances the common law rules have been changed. Though some state
statutes have been interpreted to require notice only by the lessor, generally both parties
must give notice. Ibid. See id. at 375 n.6 for examples of typical statutes.
45. Heckel v. Griese, 12 N.J. Misc. 211, 171 At. 148 (1934); Sancourt Realty Corp.
v. Dowling, 220 App. Div. 660, 222 N.Y. Supp. 288 (Sup. Ct. 1927). The advantage of
being able to label the action as one under a lease for "rent" is that in many jurisdictions the
lessor is under no duty to minimize his damages upon abandonment by the tenant. He may
leave the premises vacant and sue for the rent as it becomes due. A minority of courts
require the lessor to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to relet the premises.
See cases collected in Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 85, 119 nm203-05 (1954); Annot., 126
A.L.R. 1219 (1940). If, however, the action is one for simple breach oi contract, there
is always the duty to mitigate. See note 46 infra.
46. Ashton v. Margolies, 72 Misc. 70, 129 N.Y. Supp. 617 (Sup. Ct 1911) ; Wilson v.
Martin, 1 Denio 602 (N.Y. 1845); Mallam v. Trans-Texas Airways, 227 S.AW2d 344
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
47. White v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 2.0 (1872) ; Wright v. Stavert, [1860] 2 El. & El.
721, 121 Eng. Rep. 270; 1 AlmEaic. x LAw OF PRoPERTY § 3.7 (Casner ed. 1952). But see
Wilson v. Martin, 1 Denio 602 (N.Y. 1845).
48. Beall v. Everson, 34 A.2d 41 (lun. Ct App. D.C. 1943); Ross v. Haner, 244
S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Peaks v. Cobb, 197 Mass. 554, 83 N.E. 1106 (1903)
(contract not to "lease, underlet, nor permit any other person ... to occupy or improve"
the premises not violated by rental to a lodger) ; Wise v. Vaughner, 105 N.Y.S2d 333
(N.Y. Munic. Ct 1951). But cf. Washington Realty Co. v. Harding, 45 A.2d 785 (D.C.
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care for their own belongings, and the owner is liable for loss of their goods
only upon proof of negligence. 49 However, the innkeeper is held to a higher
degree of responsibility for the goods of his guests. Statutes in most states
have limited the common law liability of the innkeeper for non-negligent 60 loss
of valuables if he maintains a safe and posts proper notice.5 1 Yet the innkeeper
retains his common law duty as insurer 52 if he fails to comply strictly with
the statutory requirements,5 3 or if the lost goods are not covered by the statute.
In addition, varying consequences follow with respect to personal injuries
suffered by different type occupants as a result of defects on the premises. An
innkeeper impliedly warrants that the rooms he rents are fit for immediate
Mun. Ct. App. 1946). It is a logical, though unlitigated, assumption that a "no sublease"
clause would not be breached on suboccupancy by a guest.
It is possible for the owner to waive a "no sublease" clause by failure to object upon
knowledge of the suboccupant's presence. See Farose Realty Corp. v. Shaff, 117 N.Y.S.2d
375 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1952).
One possible reason for the general rule is that sublease prohibitions are not favored
and are therefore strictly construed against the owner. See Wise v. Vaughner, 105
N.Y.S.2d 338 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1951); 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 921 (1912).
49. Haff v. Adams, 6 Ariz. 395, 59 Pac. 111 (1899) (lodginghouse keeper not liable);
Asseltyne v. Fay Hotel, 222 Minn. 91, 23 N.W.2d 357 (1946) (same); Wells v. West,
212 N.C. 656, 194 S.E. 313 (1937) (same) ; Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Altamont
Springs Hotel Co., 206 Ky. 494, 267 S.W. 555 (1925) (lodginghouse keeper liable due
to negligence) ; BEALE, INNKEEPERS §§ 331, 332 (1906). Since a lodginghouse keeper is
only liable upon a showing of negligence, it would seem to follow that proof of negligence
would also be necessary to hold a landlord.
50. 'Most courts rule that even though the statute is complied with in all respects, the
innkeeper is liable for the full amount of the loss if either he or his employees are negligent.
Note, 57 Dicx. L. RFv. 348 (1953) and cases there cited.
51. See generally, BEALE, INNKEEPERS § 411-32; Note, 57 Dic,. L. Rrv. 348 (1953);
which liability may be avoided, there are two basic types: those that expressly except
from the protection of the statute goods needed in the guest's room; and those that ex-
pressly enumerate classes of goods that must be deposited with the owner in order to
be protected, the innkeeper retaining his common law liability with respect to other
property. See Note, 28 MIcH. L. REv. 345 (1930). For examples of typical statutes,
see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-1107 (1947) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 6807-09 (1949) ; NY. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 201; OHIo REv. CODE § 4721.01-.03 (1953). It is not uncommon to find in the
statutes a maximum innkeeper liability figure of $500 or less. See, e.g., ARIz. CODE ANN.
§ 62-304 (Supp. 1952); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1859 (1949).
52. A majority of American courts have held the innkeeper liable as an insurer of the
goods of his guests. That is, he is liable unless the loss is caused by act of God, act of the
public enemy or negligence of the guest. BEALE, INNKEEPERS § 185. In some jurisdictions
the innkeeper is liable only if he or his servants have been negligent. Id. at §§ 186, 187.
For a more recent collection of cases see, 28 Am. Jua., Innkeepers § 67 (1940). For a
general discussion of the innkeeper's liability, see 28 MIcH. L. REv. 345 (1930).
In case of loss by accidental fire, the innkeeper is liable vel non depending on the rule
adopted in the jurisdiction concerned. BEALE, op. cit. supra § 189 and cases there cited.
For more recent cases see 28 Am. JuR., Innkeepers § 106 (1940). See 32 IOWA L. REv.
95 (1944).
53. These statutes, being in derogation of the common law, are strictly construed,
Layton v. Seward, 320 Mich. 418, 31 N.W.2d 678 (1948) ; Kelly v. Milner Hotels, 176 Pa.
Super. 316, 106 A.2d 636 (1954).
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occupancy, 54 while the general rule is that the landlord gives no such warranty
in connection with leased premises.5 Furthermore, a landlord is under no duty
to repair defects on the premises subsequent to the signing of the lease,5" ex-
cept under statute 57 or when the tenant's duty to repair is shifted by agreement
between the parties.5 Therefore, the landlord is generally not liable for injuries
to a tenant resulting from such defects. 0 A lodginghouse keeper or innkeeper,
however, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in
54. Nettles v. Emerick, 22 F. Supp. 441 (M.D. Pa. 1938); Hotel Richmond, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 73 Ga. App. 36, 35 S.E.2d 536 (1945); Crockett v. Troyk, 78 S.W2d 1012
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
55. 1 AmERICAN LAW OF ProPERTY § 3.45 (Casner ed. 1952) and cases there cited.
The tenant is the purchaser of an estate and is therefore subject to the doctrine of caveat
emptor. Ibid. There is the so-called "furnished house!' exception to this general rule
Courts which follow this concept hold that if the lease provides for short-term occupancy
of a furnished dwelling, there may be an implied warranty of fitness. See Young v. Povich,
121 Ale. 141, 116 AtL 26 (1922); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.. 286 (1892) ;
1 AmF.mcAx LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (Casner ed. 1952). The justification for the rule
is that if such premises are leased, immediate occupancy is doubtlessly intended and thus
no opportunity of inspection is afforded the lessee. Ibid.
It is unclear what, if any, warranty, is given by a lodginghouse keeper as to the fitness
of his premises. On the one hand, it could be argued that, since a lodger is one who
contracts specially with the owner and has some opportunity to inspect the premises, he
should be subject to the same rules as a tenant. On the other hand, it would seem that
the "furnished house" exception might well be applied to the typical lodger. Indeed, in
Delamater v. Foreman, 1S4 Minn. 428, 239 NAV. 148 (1931), 16 MINUi. L. REy. 445, 17
IowA L. REv. 543 (1932), the court said that there wvas an implied covenant of fitness in
the lease of an apartment, whether furnished or unfurnished, even though the term may
not be short.
56. Coggins v. Gregorio, 97 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1938) and cases there cited; Zaval-
ney v. Donovan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 182, 160 P.2d 558 (1st Dist. 1945); HAnPn, Tonms
§ 103 (1933); PaossER, ToRTs 649-52 (1941). The landlord is liable for injuries resulting
to the tenant from latent defects existing when possession is transferred if the landlord
knew or should have known of their existence and had no reason to believe the tenant
would discover them. Ibid.
57. Some statutes place the duty of repair on the owner. See, e.g., GA. Corm Am.
§ 61-111 (1935) ("The landlord must keep the premises in repair, and shall be liable
for all substantial improvements placed upon them by his consent.") ; Micir. STATs. Aim.
§ 52843 (1949); N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW § 78 (owner required to keep premises
in "good repair"). For general discussions of these statutes, see Harkrider, Tort Liability
of A Landlord, 26 MicH. L. Ray. 383 (1928); 7 CORN. LQ. 386 (1922).
58. Coggins v. Gregorio, 97 F2d 948 (10th Cir. 1938) (dictum) ; Zavalney v. Dono-
van, 70 Cal. App. 2d 182, 184, 160 P.2d 558, 559 (1st Dist. 1945) (same). However, there
is a split of authority as to the effect of such a contract. See 6 BAYLor L Ra,. 228
(1954). Most courts say that where the owner breaks the contract, the only remedy
is an action for breach. However, an increasing minority hold the lessor liable in tort.
PaossER, ToaRs 658-61 (1941). If the owner undertakes to make certain repairs and
does so negligently, he is liable for any resulting injuries. Id. at 661.
59. Dellangelo v. Home Owner's Loan Corp., 49 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1943);
Lusco v. Jackson, 27 Ala. App. 531, 175 So. 566 (1937); Rowland v. St. Mar,'s Bank,
93 N.H. 246, 40 A2d 741 (1944).
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repair during occupancy,00 and retains a right of entry to the premises for this
purpose. 61 Therefore he may be liable for such injuries as are sustained on
the premises by a lodger or guest.' 2 The same rules apply in actions by the
occupant to recover sums expended for repairing defects as in actions to re-
cover for injuries suffered as a result of the defects. 03 Contributory negligence
of the occupant is a defense in actions by the occupant both for loss of goods
and personal injuries, regardless of the duty assumed by the owner.0
4
Judicial categorization as tenant, lodger, or guest may also result in pro-
cedural difficulties. Under statutes in many states, the landlord, lodginghouse
keeper, and innkeeper are all given liens on the property of their occupants
for unpaid rent.6 5 But delay and inconvenience may result if a strict court, by
60. Dye-Washburn Hotel Co. v. Aldridge, 207 Ala. 471, 93 So. 512 (1922) (inn-
keeper charged with duty to repair); Lonnecker v. Borris, 360 Mo. 529, 229 S.W.2d
524 (1950) (lodginghouse keeper charged with duty to repair) ; Marden v. Radford, 229
Mo. App. 789, 84 S.W.2d 947 (1935) (same). 1 AMERIcAx LAW OF PRopERMM § 3.7
(Casner ed. 1952).
61. See Vaughn v. Neal, 60 A.2d 234 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948); Marden v. Radford,
229 Mo. App. 789, 84 S.W.2d 947 (1935) ; Jones v. Shannon, 55 Mont. 225, 175 Pac. 882
(1918).
62. McCleod v. Nel-Co Corp., 350 Ill. App. 216, 112 N.E.2d 501 (1953) (innkeeper
held liable for injuries sustained from falling plaster) ; Parsons v. Dwightstate Co., 301
Mass. 324, 17 N.E.2d 197 (1938) (innkeeper held liable for defective shower valve);
Nelson v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co., 9 N.J. Misc. 1240, 157 At. 133 (1931)
(innkeeper held liable for injuries to occupant sustained as a result of stepping on a
needle on the floor of the room) ; Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789, 84 S.W.2d 947
(1935) (lodginghouse keeper held liable for defective drainboard in kitchen).
63. If the lessor has covenanted to make repairs, the tenant may make such repairs
if necessary and sue the owner for the cost. 1 AmFRicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.79 (Casner
ed. 1952). It would seem to follow logically that, since a lodginghouse keeper and inn-
keeper are under a duty to repair even without a covenant, a lodger or guest would have
a right of action for reimbursement of any money expended for repairs.
64. Corrigan v. San Marcos Hotel Co., 182 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1950) (guest barred
in action for lost belongings) ; Shiman Bros. & Co. v. Nebraska National Hotel Co., 146
Neb. 47, 18 N.W.2d 551 (1945) (same); Driskill Hotel Co. v. Anderson, 19 S.W.2d 210
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (same).
St. Paul Hotel Co. v. Lohm, 196 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1952) (guest barred in action for
personal injuries) ; Duncan v. Chelsea Hotel Co., 326 Ill. App. 241, 61 N.E.2d 769 (1915)
(same) ; Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953) (same).
Zavalney v. Donovan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 182, 160 P.2d 558 (1st Dist. 1945) (tenant
barred in action for personal injuries) ; Turner v. Long, 61 Ga. App. 785, 7 S.E.2d 595
(1940) (same) ; Elson v. Renoclaf Realty Corp., 248 App. Div. 212, 290 N.Y. Supp. 644
(Sup. Ct. 1936) (same).
Also see note 52 supra.
65. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7247, 7248 (1949) (innkeeper and lodginghouse
keeper) ; CAL. Civ. COD- § 1861 (1949) (hotel, motel, inn, boardinghouse, and lodging-
house keepers) ; ILL. Rav. STAT. c. 82, § 57 (1953). At common law, although the inn-
keeper had a lien on the goods of a guest, the lodginghouse keeper had no such lien.
BArLE, INNKEEPERS § 252, p. 176 n.3 (1906). Though the landlord had no common law lien,
he did have the right to seize the tenant's goods for overdue rent in an action of
distress. Wilson v. Martin, 1 Denio 602 (N.Y. 1845). Due to the harshness of this
remedy, many states have either modified it considerably or completely abandoned it in
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categorization of the occupant, finds that the owner has proceeded under the
wrong lien statute.66 Moreover, lodgers or guests may be evicted by the owner
for good cause without resort to legal process.0" However, tenants may only
be evicted by resort to an action of ejectment or prescribed statutory proce-
dures.68 Thus a landlord may find himself liable in damages if he mistakenly
pursues some other means of eviction.69 The categorizations are also important
with respect to various state statutes and municipal regulatory and zoning
ordinances, which grant certain rights and privileges only to specified classes
of occupants and owners."
0
Use and Enjoyment of the Rented Premises
The greater protection given to some occupants in cases involving the use
and enjoyment of rented premises 'I seems justifiable only if based on a theory
of residence. Notice to quit, for example, provides the occupant with sufficient
opportunity to find other accommodations.72 Such notice is necessary only
favor of some form of statutory lien. 1 AIERiCANx LAW OF PnorzT , § 3.72 (Casner ed.
1952) ; 2 id. § 9.47.
66. Such a situation seems analogous to that which existed before certain types of
owners were given liens. See, e.g., Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 05 At. 529
(1912) ("landlord" not entitled to statutory lien given "lodginghouse keeper"); Brin v.
Sidenstucker, 232 Iowa 1258, 8 N.W.2d 423 (1943) ("landlord" not entitled to lien given
"innkeepers") ; Harden v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. Rep. 493, 34 S.W. 591 (1905) ("lodginghouse
keeper" not entitled to lien given "boardinghouse keeper").
67. Raider v. Dixie Inn, 193 Ky. 152, 248 S.W. 229 (1923) ; Jacob v. Jacob, 125 Misc.
649, 650, 212 N.Y. Supp. 62, 64 (City Ct. 1925) (dictum); McBride v. Hosey, 197 S.W2d
372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). In evicting the occupant, the owner may use as much furce
as is necessary under the circumstances. Neely v. Lott Hotels Co., 334 Ill. App. 91, 7S
N.E.2d 659 (1948). See also Perrine v. Paulos, 100 Cal. App. 2d 655, 224 P.2d 41 (1950)
(innkeeper liable in damages since good cause not shown).
68. For a general discussion of these statutes, passed as an alternative to the cumber-
some action of ejectment, see 32 Am. Jum, Landlord and Tenant § 1016 (1941). The owner
usually must show good cause and prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship.
Ibid. But see Roberts v. Casey, 36 Cal. App. 2d 767, 93 P.2d 654 (Super. Ct. 1939) (un-
lawful detainer statute interpreted so as to allow suit against lodger as well as tenant).
69. Lambert v. Sine, 256 P.2d 241 (Utah 1953) (Held: occupant a "tenant" and
therefore allowed to recover damages for owner's failure to resort to unlawful detainer
statute).
70. City of Independence v. Richardson, 117 Kan. 656, 232 Pac. 1044 (1925)
("rooming house" not covered by taxing regulations governing inter alia, "boarding
houses," "hotels," "taverns," and "inns"); Von Der Heide v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
204 Misc. 746, 123 N.Y.S2d 726 (Sop. Ct.), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 1076, 126 N.Y.S2d 352
(2d Dep't 1953) (motel not within prohibition against building of 'inns" in certain area).
Other consequences sometimes arise from the tenant-lodger-guest distinctions. See,
e.g., Birmingham Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Drennen, 175 Ala. 338, 57 So. 876
(1911) (lodger could not serve as juror in case involving owner of premises) ; Sloan %.
Court Hotel, 72 Cal. App. 2d 30, 164 P.2d 516 (1945) (status determined whether change
of venue would be granted).
71. See text at note 42 supra.
72. See generally, Hundley v. Milner Hotel 'Management Co., 114 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.
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for the occupant who is residing on the premises either permanently or for the
forseeable future; the transient can move more quickly and need not be so
particular about substitute accommodations for the remainder of a temporary
stay. Similarly, the right to bring an action of ejectment or nuisance is granted
to an occupant whose permanent residence on the premises has been severed
or disturbed.73 The transient, however, has but a passing interest in the use
of the premises and has relatively free access to other temporary quarters;
therefore less reason exists to allow him to bring these actions. Finally, tile
purpose of a clause which prohibits subletting is presumably to prevent an
occupant from taking up long-term residence on the premises without the prior
approval of the owner. The owner has much less reason to object if the
tenant's rooms are used briefly by a transient.
Yet the theory used by courts to grant greater protection to the tenant than
to the lodger or guest is that only the tenant has an "interest in land."'74 And
they have reasoned that only by exclusive possession of the premises can an
occupant have the interest in land required for protection as a tenant.75 Thus,
in deciding use and enjoyment cases, courts have generally considered only
those facts relating to exclusiveness and have largely ignored facts relating to
the occupant's permanency of residence.
In holding an occupant to be a lodger and therefore not entitled to notice to
quit, courts have considered the following facts significant: the premises were
furnished ;76 the owner provided towels and linens,77 fuel and water,78 and
maid service ;79 the owner had access to or exercised "general supervision and
control" over the occupant's rooms.80 The emphasis given these factors, all
of which are irrelevant in determining residence, has resulted in judicial denial
of notice to quit to occupants who were paying rent at monthly intervals and
who had resided on the premises for periods ranging from several months to
Ky. 1953) ; Graf v. Miller, 202 Misc. 887, 120 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Gladwell v.
Holcomb, 60 Ohio St. 427, 54 N.E. 473 (1899) ; Chi-Okla Oil and Gas Co. v. Shertzer, 105
Okla. 111, 231 Pac. 877 (1924) ; 32 Am. JuR., Landlord and Tenant § 993 (1941).
73. See Auldridge v. Spraggin, 349 Mo. 858, 163 S.W.2d 1042 (1942) (ejectment).
It seems that permanency of residence is necessary to bring an action for nuisance for
injuries to the property. However, an increasing number of jurisdictions permit even
a short-term occupant to sue for personal injuries caused by a nuisance. See note 43
supra.
74. See note 11 supra.
75. Ibid.
76. Tamamian v. Gabbard, 55 A.2d 513 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947).
77. Ibid.; Messerly v. Mercer, 45 Mo. App. 327 (1891).
78. Ibid.
79. Neely v. Lott Hotels Co., 334 Ill. App. 91, 78 N.E.2d 659 (1948); Messerly v.
Mercer, 45 Mo. App. 327 (1891).
80. Tamamian v. Gabbard, 55 A.2d 513 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947) ; Dewar v. Minne-
apolis Lodge No. 44, B. & P.O.E., 155 Minn. 98, 192 N.W. 358 (1923).
In the recent case of Hundley v. Milner Hotel Management Co., 114 F. Supp. 206
(W. D. Ky. 1953), the court felt that the following facts, inter alia, indicated landlord-
tenant relationship: meals prepared in room and no maid service.
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several years."' These occupants seem to have been clearly prejudiced by
eviction without notice.
Similarly, in construing clauses which prohibit subletting,6 courts, by
utilizing the exclusiveness test, have often disregarded what would seem to be
the clear intent of the lessor.8 3 They have considered the following facts as
evidence that the occupant renting from the tenant was a lodger and that the
tenant was therefore not in breach of the "no sublease" clause: the occupant
rented furnished premises or a single room ;84 the occupant shared bath and
kitchen ;s5 maid service was supplied;sG the owner had a right of entry to
repair.8 7 Since sublease prohibitions differ in wordingss consideration should
first be given to the construction of the particular clause. Where the clause
prohibits only "subletting," the intent of the owner would seem to be defeated
by the above approach, which has allowed occupants to reside on the premises
without prior approval for periods as long as a year.8 9
81. See, e.g., Tamamian v. Gabbard, 55 A2d 513 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947) (weekly
payments, occupancy for over a year); Neely v. Lott Hotels Co., 334 Ill. App. 91, 78
N.E2d 659 (1948) (two and one-half years residence on the premises, payment intervals
undetermined); Dewar v. 'Minneapolis Lodge No. 44, B. & P.O.E., 155 Minn. 93, 192
NAV. 358 (1923) (monthly payments, several months' residence).
82. Such clauses are strictly construed against the owner. See Wise v. Vaughner,
105 N.Y.S2d 338 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1951); 1 TiFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 152
(1912) and cases there cited.
83. Consider, e.g., the holding in Peaks v. Cobb, 197 Mass. 554, 83 N.E. 1105 (1903),
discussed in note 48 supra.
84. Application of Bierman, 274 App. Div. 1003, 84 N.Y.S.2d 355 (2d Dep't 1948)
(single room); Farose Realty Corp. v. Shaff, 117 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1952)
(furnished premises and single room).
85. Simmons v. Weinsoff, 58 A.2d 497 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. f948).
86. Mullins v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W. 825 (1916) ; Peaks v. Cobbs, 197 Mass.
554, 83 N.E. 1106 (1908). Mullins is a classic example of a court sidestepping legal tcchni-
calities to reach a just result. The case was a damage action for injuries and deaths caused
by the burning of a hotel which, the court found, had no adequate fire escapes. The
owner argued that a "no sublease" clause had been breached and thus certain lodgers
were trespassers and could not recover. The clause in question read: 'The said property
is to be used as hereinafter described and not otherwise, viz., to be used as a family resi-
denrce; it being understood that this prohibits the right to sublet any part of the premises
for rooming purposes." Despite the "rooming purposes" phrase, the court held that the
word "sublet" restricted the scope of the clause to situations wherein "tenants" were
brought in under a sublease and thus the owner was held liable.
87. Simmons v. Weinsoff, 58 A.2d 497 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948).
In Beall v. Everson, 34 A.2d 41 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1943), the court, finding that
the parties had stipulated in the lower court that the occupants were "roomers," declined
to consider any facts at all in holding that there w.as no breach of a sublease prohibition.
88. Compare the clause in Peaks . Cobb, 197 Mass. 554, 83 N.E. 1106 (1903), quoted
in note 48 sup ra, with the one in fullins v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W. 25 (1916),
quoted in note 86 sutra.
89. Simmons v. Weinsoff, 58 A.2d 497 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948) (over a year);
Farose Realty Corporation v. Shaff, 117 N.Y.S2d 375 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1952) (six
months).
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Permanency of residence, however, has sometimes been considered in deter-
mining the occupant's right to bring certain types of possessory actions. For
instance, an occupant was held a tenant, and therefore subject to eviction only
by statutory procedures, because of his permanency of residence.90 And a long-
term resident in a private home, sharing some facilities with the owner, was
allowed to recover as a tenant for damages caused by a nuisance.0 1 Yet, in
another case, permanent occupants paying at a monthly rate were held lodg-
ers and denied the right to claim continued possession of premises sold fol-
lowing foreclosure, on the ground that they were not in exclusive possession
since they shared certain facilities with the owner.
92
The facts which should be of greatest weight in determining whether the
occupant should receive notice to quit and whether he should have the right
to bring possessory actions are those which relate to his permanency of resi-
dence on the premises: the length of his stay, the length of the rental period,
and the presence or absence of another home. The same criteria should be
applied to a suboccupant in determining whether the tenant is in breach of a
"no sublease" clause. There are indications in recent years that the courts are
becoming increasingly aware of the importance of these facts.03
90. In Lambert v. Sine, 256 P.2d 241 (Utah 1953), the court held that an occupant
who had lived in a three-room motel unit for 2 2 months could only be dispossessed by
resort to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-36-1 to -11 (1953)-the unlawful detainer statute. The
court noted as indicative of tenant status that: the unit was designed and equipped for
permanent housekeeping; the occupant remained for a longer period than the ordinary
transient; the unit was supplied the living needs of a home; the rent was payable bi-
monthly.
91. Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 AtI. 688 (1909). There, plaintiff oc upied
three rooms in a dwelling house. She had been on the premises nine months, and she
and her family ate their meals with the owner of the house. It is uncertain whether this
court was actually considering the situation in terms of "residence," because the opinion
makes frequent references to the test of "exclusive possession."
92. Taylor v. Dean, 78 A.2d 382 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951). There, three families,
including the owner's, occupied a six-room dwelling house. Bathroom, kitchen and dining
room facilities were shared. The owner supplied utilities and paid repair bills, The families
paid rent at monthly intervals.
93. Hundley v. Milner Hotel Management Co., 114 F. Supp. 206 (W.D. Ky. 1953).
There, an occupant sued for wrongful eviction because of failure of the owner to give
notice to quit. Held: the occupant was a tenant and entitled to notice. The court found
these facts as indicative of a tenant relationship: occupant furnished own rooms; no maid
service; occupant used rooms for housekeeping and prepared meals in them; occupant not
a transient; occupant did some minor decorating and repairing; monthly rental. See also
Washington Realty Co. v. Harding, 45 A.2d 785 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1946), where the
owner claimed breach of a sublease prohibition. Held: since the owner did not live on the
premises and since some of the occupants in question had been on the premises for two
or three years, there was enough evidence of breach to send the case to the jury. And see
McBride v. Hosey, 197 S.W2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). There, a hotel occupant
brought an action for wrongful eviction. Held: for owner. Though the occupant had been
there over nine months, he was in arrears in rent and had been given four days notice to
quit. Moreover, he had procured substitute accommodations at the first place lie applied.
And see Lambert v. Sine, 256 P.2d 241 (Utah 1953) (see facts cited in note 90 supra).
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Property Lost by Fire anzd Theft
When goods of a rental occupant are lost, either by theft or by destruction
of the building by fire, the occupant frequently brings an action against the
owner to recover their value. Usually the property is lost from the occupant's
room, and neither party is negligent.' 4 Where by common law the innkeeper
is held to be an insurer 95 and where no statute limits his liability for the
property in question,9 a guest may recover the full value of his lost property.
7
The lodger, however, may not recover.9s
Although seldom clearly expressed, the basic issue in these cases is which of
two innocent parties should bear the risk of loss.9 9 Here again, permanency of
residence should be of controlling importance. The occupant residing perma-
nently on the premises has presumably been able to assess the nature of his
rental dwelling as well as the integrity of the owner and his employees, while
the transient has had no such opportunity.100 Moreover, the resident is in
a position to make adequate arrangements for the safekeeping of his money
and valuables. The transient, on the other hand, may be forced to leave his
property in relatively accessible places. Accordingly, there is justification for
allowing only the short-term occupant to recover for stolen goods from an
innocent owner. In cases of accidental destruction of the premises by fire, not
even a permanent resident may have been able to protect his possessions effec-
tively. However, a tenant in an apartment building bears the risk of loss of
his own property in such situations.10 ' The same reasons would seem to justify
imposing the risk of loss from fire, as well as from theft, on the long-term
occupant of a hotel or inn.10 2
94. See, e.g., Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1092 (1S92);
Gray v. Drexel Arms Hotel, 146 Ill. App. 604 (1909); Roberts v. Case Hotel Co., 106
Mlisc. 481,175 N.Y. Supp. 123 (Sup. Ct 1919).
95. See note 52 supra.
96. It has already been observed that many jurisdictions now have statutes limiting
the common law liability of an innkeeper. See note 51 stpra. This discussion is concerned
only with those situations where, either because there is no limiting statute or because it is
for some reason not applicable, the common law liability of the innkeeper is in force.
For an example of one such situation, see Smith v. Dorchester Hotel Co., 145 Wash.
344, 259 Pac. 1085 (1927).
97. See text at note 49 supra.
98. Ibid.
99. See Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 678, 26 Pac. 1099 (1891); Mason
v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280, 20 Am. Dec. 471 (Mass. 1830).
100. See McIntosh v. Schops, 92 Ore. 307, 180 Pac. 593 (1919).
101. The general rule is that a tenant can only recover for goods lost by fire when
the owner is proved negligent. See Cooper v. Lawson, 139 Mich. 628, 103 N.AV. 163
(1905); Grubbe v. Lein Realty Corp., 37 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941); Ed%%ards
v. Holeson, 189 Va. 948, 54 S.E2d 857 (1949). See also cases collected in Annot., 66
A.L.R. 1393 (1930).
102. It has been argued that a hotel owner or innkeeper should bear the loss because
he can adjust his rates to cover such contingencies. Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93
Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099 (1891). This argument has merit when the loss is suffered by a
short-term occupant who is paying at the regular transient rate. However, it seems of
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Yet only a minority of courts, in determining whether an occupant is a
guest or a lodger, for purposes of recovery of lost property, consider perma-
nency of residence. 10 3 Instead, some focus attention upon whether the owner
and the occupant had entered into a special contract regarding length of stay,
price, or both.10 4 And many others consider decisive whether the rental unit
was located in a hotel or in an apartment house.1 5
Courts which employ the special contract test have denied even the short-
term occupant the right to recover for lost goods if he has made such a con-
tract. 06 U'nder modern conditions, however, most individuals coming to hotels
or tourist homes can, with preciseness, fix in advance the limits of their visit
and the rate to be paid. A short-term occupant should not be held a lodger
merely because he has chosen to make advance arrangements. Nor should a
long-term resident be considered a guest because he has failed to make his
desires explicit. 10 7 The significance attributed to a special contract in loss of
goods cases has been increasingly deemphasized in recent years.' 08
Those courts which consider the nature of the rental dwelling as determin-
ative of the rights of the occupant have allowed long-term occupants of hotels
and inns to recover as guests, 00 reasoning that these occupants retain the
doubtful validity with respect to the long-term occupant who receives a special rate
below that of the ordinary transient.
103. See Haff v. Adams, 6 Ariz. 395, 59 Pac. 111 (1899) ; Magee v. Pacific Improve-
ment Co., 98 Cal. 678, 33 Pac. 772 (1893) ; Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal, 253,
26 Pac. 1099 (1891); Gray v. Drexel Arms Hotel, 146 Ill. App. 604 (1909) ; Asseltyne v.
Fay Hotel, 222 Minn. 91, 23 N.W.2d 357 (1946); Mason v. Hotel Grand Union, Inc., 41
N.Y.S.2d 309 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943); McIntosh v. Schops, 92 Ore. 307, 180 Pac. 593
(1919).
104. See Clifford v. Stafford, 145 Ill. App. 247 (1908) ; Vance v. Throckmorton &
Anderson, 68 Ky. 41, 96 Am. Dec. 327 (1868); Meacham v. Galloway, 102 Tenn. 415,
52 S.W. 859 (1899); Driskill Hotel Co. v. Anderson, 19 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ, App.
1929) ; Daniel v. Hotel Pacific Pty., Ltd., [1953] Argus L. Rep. 1043.
105. See Pettit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 S.W. 501 (1912) ; Burdock v. Chicago
Hotel Co., 172 11. 185 (1912) ; Layton v. Seward, 320 Mich. 418, 31 N.W.2d 678 (1948) ;
Leon v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 134 Neb. 137, 277 N.W. 823 (1938) ; Hancock v. Rand,
94 N.Y. 1, 46 Am. Rep. 112 (1883); Roberts v. Case Hotel Co., 106 Misc. 481, 175
N.Y. Supp. 123 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Driskill Hotel Co. v. Anderson, 19 S.W.2d 216 (Tex,
Civ. App. 1929).
106. See, e.g., Clifford v. Stafford, 145 Ill. App. 247 (1908) (contract for 1 week
stay) ; Meacham v. Galloway, 102 Tenn. 415, 52 S.W. 859 (1899) (contract for 3 weeks
stay) ; Daniel v. Hotel Pacific Pty., Ltd., [1953] Argus L. Rep. 1043 (group of occupants
contracted for stays ranging from 9-21 days).
The existence of a special contract is not an accurate indication of an occupant's
permanency of residence. See generally, Pettit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 S.W. 501
(1912); Hancock v. Rand, 94 N.Y. 1, 46 Am. Rep. 112 (1883); Jalie v. Cardinal, 35
Wis. 118 (1874).
107. See Daniel v. Hotel Pacific Pty. Ltd., [1953] Argus L. Rep. 1043, 1050 (dissent-
ing opinion).
108. See, e.g., Layton v. Seward, 320 Mich. 418, 31 N.W.2d 678 (1948); Hart v.
Mills Hotel Trust, 144 Misc. 121, 258 N.Y. Supp. 417 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1932); Smith v.
Dorchester Hotel Co., 145 Wash. 344, 259 Pac. 1085 (1927).
109. See, e.g., Burdock v. Chicago Hotel Co., 172 I11. App. 185 (1912) (nine months
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character of travelers regardless of the length of their stay. 0 Granting re-
covery to such occupants may be justified on a theory that the owner is in a
better position to absorb the loss."' However, this approach seems unduly
generous to permanent occupants, who would not be able to recover if they
were tenants or lodgers in apartment buildings."-' Moreover, it overlooks the
fact that both guests and lodgers may occupy the same rental dwelling and
maintain differing legal relationships with the owner.'
1 3
A third group of courts has denied recovery for loss of goods to occupants
residing in rental dwellings for periods from several months to several years
by classifying such occupants as lodgers.114 These courts, however, have allowed
shorter term occupants to recover as guests." 5 In addition to the occupant's
length of stay, they have considered as factors indicating permanency of r~si-
dence the absence of another home, 11 and weekly and monthly rental pay-
ments." 7 For reasons already stated,l s this approach seems the most equitable
method of distributing the risk of loss of goods from fire and theft.
Negligence of the owner is a prerequisite to recovery by a lodger for lost
belongings." 9 Courts have followed orthodox tort principles to determine
whether the owner breached his duty of protecting the occupant's property.
stay in hotel) ; Layton v. Seward, 320 Mich. 418, 31 N.W.2d 67S (194S) (four months
stay in hotel); Leon v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 134 Neb. 137, 277 N.W. 823 (1938)
(several months stay in hotel; no other home) ; Hancock v. Rand, 94 N.Y. 1, 46 Am. Rep.
112 (1883) (same); Driskill Hotel Co. v. Anderson, 19 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929) (one year stay in hotel). But cf. Roberts v. Case Hotl Co., lC5 'Misc. 131, 175
N.Y. Supp. 123 (Sup. Ct 1919) (one week stay in apartment house; held lodger).
110. See cases cited note 109 supra.
111. See Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099 (1891).
112. Murray v. Hagens, 143 So. 505 (La. App. 1932); Gibson v. Von Glahn Hotel
Co., 185 N.Y. Supp. 154 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Wells v. West, 212 N.C. 655, 194 S.E. 313
(1937).
113. See note 5 siupra.
114. Gray v. Drexel Arms Hotel, 146 Ill. App. 604 (1909) (four months); Asseltyne
v. Fay Hotel, 222 Minn. 91, 23 N.V.2d 357 (1946) (several months) ; Mason v. Hotel
Grand Union, Inc., 41 N.Y.S2d 309 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943) (two and one-half years); Mc-
Intosh v. Schops, 92 Ore. 307, 180 Pac. 593 (1919) (two years).
115. Magee v. Pacific Improvement Co., 98 Cal. 678, 33 Pac. 772 (1893) (ten days);
Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099 (1S91) (a little over a week) ;
Moon v. Yarian, 147 Ill. App. 383 (1909) (two months); Lusk v. Belote, 22 Minn. 468
(1876) (one month); Hart v. Mills Hotel Trust, 144 Misc. 121, 258 N.Y. Supp. 417
(N.Y. Munic. Ct 1932) (three weeks).
116. See Haff v. Adams, 6 Ariz. 395, 59 Pac. 111 (1899); Mason v. Hotel Grand
Union, Inc., 41 N.Y.S.2d 309 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943).
117. See Asseltyne v. Fay Hotel, 222 Minn. 91, 23 N.W.2d 357 (1946); McIntosh
v. Schops, 92 Ore. 307, 180 Pac. 593 (1919). Paying by the day is more indicative of
the transient guest
118. See p.405 supra.
119. See note 49 supra. Proving negligence on the part of an innkeeper may also be
important Negligence by him or his servants will suspend the application of liability-
limiting statutes. See note 50 supra. Furthermore, it is necessary in some jurisdictions
to prove an innkeeper negligent even in the absence of statute. See note 52 supra.
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Where goods have been stolen from the rooms of a lodger, courts have con-
sidered the following facts as evidence that the owner was not negligent: the
owner exercised care in selecting servants ;120 the rented room had no outside
approaches ;121 clerks, elevator operators, or watchmen were on duty at all
times ;122 notices of the existence of a safe were prominently posted.12 3
In cases of theft of an occupant's property from parts of a rental dwelling
other than his rooms, courts have correctly stressed the owner's custody over
the property at the time of its disappearance rather than the occupant's status.
12 4
Thus, where money disappeared from a hotel safe,' 2 1 and a car was stolen from
a hotel garage to which only the owner had a key,12 6 the losses were presumed
to have occurred by the theft or negligence of the innkeeper or his servants.
Courts have also held agreements between the parties with respect to duties
assumed or negatived to be important in determining liability. 
2 7
Personal Injuries Sustained On Rented Premises
Exclusiveness of possession underlies both judicial refusal to impose lia-
bility on owners for injuries to tenants and imposition of such liability for in-
juries to lodgers and guests. Since an owner has no right to enter the rooms
of a tenant during occupancy, courts reason that no duty of repair can be placed
upon him ;128 since the owner retains the right to enter the premises of a lodger
or guest, he is charged with the duty of keeping these rooms in reasonable
repair.12 9 Following the traditional exclusiveness test, courts have allowed an
occupant to recover where the owner supplied maid service and utilities and re-
120. See Gray v. Drexel Arms Hotel, 146 II1. App. 604 (1909).
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.; Mason v. Hotel Grand Union, Inc., 41 N.Y.S.2d 309 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943);
Gibson v. Von Glahn Hotel Co., 185 N.Y. Supp. 154 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
123. See Mason v. Hotel Grand Union, Inc., 41 N.Y.S.2d 309 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943).
124. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Altamont Springs Hotel Co., 206 Ky.
494, 267 S.W. 555 (1925); Layton v. Seward, 320 Mich. 418, 31 N.W.2d 678 (1948).
125. In Layton v. Seward, supra note 124, the occupant deposited $3500.00 at the
hotel desk in an envelope provided by the owner of the hotel. The owner put the money
in a safe from whence it disappeared. The court held that on the basis of these facts
and in the absence of any other explanation, the loss is presumed to have occurred by
the theft or negligence of the owner or his employees.
126. In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Altamont Springs Hotel Co., 206 Ky. 494,
267 S.W. 555 (1925), an occupant who was under a special contract with a hotel for one
month kept his car in the hotel garage; the car was stolen. Evidence showed that the
hotel owner had control over the car at the time it was stolen and that there was no
contributory negligence. The hotel owner was held liable.
127. In Vigeant v. Nelson, 140 I1. App. 644 (1908), a trunk belonging to a lodger
was stolen from the storage room in a hotel. The owner had assumed care and custody
of the trunk. However, the court held the owner free from negligence because of the
presence of a sign in the hotel hall reading: "Baggage or wearing apparel left for storage
will receive careful attention at the owner's risk."
128. See, e.g., Coggins v. Gregorio, 97 F2d 948 (10th Cir. 1938) ; 1 TiFFANY, LANL .
LORD AND TENANT 574 (1912).
129. See, e.g., Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789, 84 S.W.2d 947 (1935).
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tained a key to the occupant's hotel rooms, 30 and they have denied recovery
where the premises were unfurnished and the owner provided no maid service
and had no right of entry.' 31 However, many of the factors indicating that
the occupant is not in exclusive possession are irrelevant to the basic issue in
these cases: which party had the duty of repair?
All courts, even those following the exclusiveness test, have given some at-
tention to the question of assumption of the duty to repair. Thus, one court
in granting recovery to an occupant who did not enjoy exclusive possession,
weighed the fact that the owner considered himself under such a duty.132
And where the owner had promised to repair when notified of defects, even
a tenant was allowed to recover. 133 Similarly, recovery was denied where an
occupant with exclusive possession had rented with the understanding that he
would have the duty of repair.' 34 Courts have also emphasized the proved
intent of the parties to enter into a landlord-tenant relationship as indicative
of assumption of duty by the occupant.' 35 Since courts have usually found an
explicit duty of repair in the same party upon whom such duty would have
been imposed under the exclusiveness test, 30 the results in these cases appear
sound. However, slavish adherence to the exclusiveness test may yield un-
fortunate results in cases where no assumption of duty can be established.137
130. Ibid. In Marden, the leading case in this field, the occupant vas held a lodger
and granted recovery for injuries sustained in a fall caused by an inadequately supported
drainboard.
131. See Coggins v. Gregorio, 97 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1938) (occupant injured by
falling plaster); Martin v. Shryock Realty Co., 236 Mlo. App. 1265, 163 SAV.2d 804
(1942) (occupant injured by fall on sharp, protruding bathroom fixture).
132. See Mlarden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789, 84 SAV.2d 947 (1935); note 130
supra.
133. See Garner v. La Marr, 88 Ga. App. 364, 76 S.E.2d 721 (1953), 6 BAY-.on L REv.
2278 (1954) (falling plaster injured occupants).
134. See Coggins v. Gregorio, 97 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1938). See also Zavalney v.
Donovan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 182, 160 P.2d 558 (1st Dist. 1945), where a court denied
recovery to a tenant for injuries caused by a splintered faucet handle. The tenant had
been aware of the defective handle when he rented the premises eleven months previously
and had failed to notify the landlord of the defect.
135. See Zavalney v. Donovan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 182, 160 P2d 55S (1st Dist. 1945).
See also Martin v. Shryock Realty Co., 236 Mo. App. 1265, 163 SA..2d 804 (1942)
(contract between the parties indicated landlord-tenant relationship).
In Cottmire v. 181 East Lake Shore Drive Hotel Co., 330 Ill. App. 549, 71 N.E.2d
823 (1947), the court held that a permanent resident in a hotel could recover for injuries
caused by a defective bathroom fixture under an Illinois statute which, the court felt,
made all hotel occupants "guests" regardless of length of stay.
136. See, e.g., farden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789, 84 SAV.2d 947 (1935) (owner
admitted duty to repair rooms of lodger) ; Coggins v. Gregorio, 97 F2d 948 (10th Cir.
1938) (tenant understood that he was to do all work necessary to keep the apartment in
repair). See also Martin v. Shryock Realty Co., 236 Mo. App. 1265, 163 SAV2d 804
(1942) (owher never assumed any duty to repair premises of tenant).
137. If, by application of the exclusiveness test, the occupant is held to be a tenant,
courts are justified in absolving the owner; since he has no right to enter, the owner
can have no duty to repair. However, when an occupant is a lodger under the exclusiveness
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Certain elements of the exclusiveness test, such as whether maid or janitorial
service was supplied or whether the owner had the right of inspection, are im-
portant in determining liability when neither party has clearly assumed the
duty of repair, since they indicate whether the owner had or should have had
knowledge of defects on the premises. In addition to these facts, courts should
consider the occupant's permanency of residence: a long-term resident has
presumably had an opportunity to inspect his rooms and repair defects, whereas
the transient guest has had no such opportunity. 138 However, neither ex-
clusiveness nor permanency factors should be considered controlling when
owner or occupant has explicitly undertaken or negatived a duty of repair.
Conclusion
The categorizations of tenant, lodger, and guest have too frequently become
the end rather than the means of judicial inquiry 130 in cases involving the
rights and duties of owners and occupants of rented premises. 140 Courts have
stressed, in all types of actions, an unchanging aggregate of facts for the pur-
pose of categorizing the occupant: from these categories, consequences have
followed as a matter of law. Since the underlying bases of the actions involv-
ing an owner-occupant relationship are so widely varied, the relevant facts
also vary. But the courts, by emphasizing the same set of facts in all types of
cases, have made no effort to discriminate between those which are important
in a particular action and those which are not. Facts such as permanency of
residence, although often ignored, should almost always be considered signifi-
cant. Others, such as whether the owner supplied utilities or retained a key
to the rented premises, have become meaningless under modem conditions and
should be discarded.1 41 Courts, when categorizing an occupant in order to
test, the owner should not necessarily be held to have assumed the duty of repair, since the
fact that the owner has the right to enter does not prevent an assumption of duty by the
occupant or a waiver by the occupant of the owner's duty to repair. See also note 58 sIupra.
13& For cases in which length of stay is considered important, see Duncan v. Chelsea
Hotel Co., 326 Ill. App. 241, 61 N.E.2d 769 (1945) (seven years residence-recovery
denied) ; Fonyo v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 296 Ill. App. 227, 16 N.E.2d 192 (1938)
(same; nearly two years residence) ; Martin v. Shryock Realty Co., 236 Mo. App. 1265,
163 S.W.2d 804 (1942) (same; three and one-half years residence).
139. See McDOUGAL & HABER, PROPERTY, WALTH, LAND 342, note (b) (1948).
140. It is interesting to note that the categorizations have never been applied to
business premises. 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 34 (1912). Such an application
would perhaps convert the great mass of business occupants into lodgers under the ex-
clusiveness test, since few provide for their own cleaning services or utilities. Thus,
perhaps the failure to extend the categorizations to business premises is because the
occupant would then be entitled to no notice to quit, no effective sublease prohibitions
would be possible, and the owner of the property would be under a duty to keep the
premises in repair.
141. The question of who supplied utilities was perhaps a legitimate subject of in-
quiry in the days when it was necessary for the owner to enter the occupant's rooms to
perform such services as supplying coal, firewood, and water. Today, however, tile owner
frequently "supplies" utilities by simply paying the monthly bill with part of the rental
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determine his rights, should consider only those facts relevant to the action
being brought. In this way both owner and occupant will be amply protected.
which he receives from the occupant. Nevertheless, even some of the most recent cases
still consider that the supplying of utilities by the owner %as a significant fact in
determining lodger or guest status. See Hundley v. Milner Hotel Management Co., 114
F. Supp. 206 (,V.D. Ky. 1953); Lambert v. Sine, 256 P2d 241 (Utah 1953).
The exclusiveness and transiency tests have themselves been attacked as outmoded.
See 1 A.MER cAi LAw oF PRoPERTY § 3.7 (Casner ed. 1952); Daniel v. Hotel Pacific Pry.,
Ltd., [1953] Argus L. Rep. 1043, 1047 ("The root of the trouble is that we are applying
to present-day complex conditions a concept that originated in, and applied to, a much
simpler state of society.").
